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The Cologne Information Model: Representing 
Information Persistently [2009] 
Manfred Thaller ∗ 
Abstract: »Das Kölner Informationsmodell: Informationen dauerhaft repräsentie-
ren«. If we want to decide, whether two digital files contain exactly the same 
amount of information, or of how precisely the amount of information they con-
tain differs, we need an abstract model of the information, unto which the in-
stances represented by the content of two different files can be projected. A meta 
model for this purpose is presented. It differentiates between the byte values rep-
resenting the payload in a file and the significant properties of that payload rep-
resented by meta information in the file. That model is embedded into a broader 
discussion of the best way to understand the nature of information as it influ-
ences the processing of the representations derived from the data in question. 
Links to the software solution implemented in the Planets project for the pro-
cessing of data following the model proposed are provided. 
Keywords: Long term preservation, information theory, significant properties of 
digital objects. 
1.  Introduction 
The long-term discussions, both within the Planets consortium as well as in 
general, quote as a truism that “preserving the byte stream is not enough”. While 
this is undoubtedly true, what information systems ultimately store are byte streams 
and byte streams only, even if some of them are used to describe other byte streams. 
If we take the preservation of digital data serious, in such a form that they can be 
handled on a large scale by automatic processes, we need an abstraction which 
allows the handling of digital content in such a form that distinct units of digital 
data represent meaningful units of information which are functionally complete. On 
a pragmatic level of software engineering, the XCDL tries to accomplish this by 
providing for a language which allows to represent the complete content of arbitrary 
information objects – or at least shows a medium in which to express such represen-
tations. 
                                                             
∗  Reprint of: Manfred Thaller. 2009. The Cologne Information Model: Representing Infor-
mation Persistently. In The eXtensible Characterisation Languages – XCL, ed. Manfred Thal-
ler, 223-39, Hamburg. 
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This paper introduces, on a more abstract level, the conceptual model which un-
derlies the XCDL. As this model reflects a specific concept of the nature of infor-
mation and its representation on computers, it is introduced in a general way, inde-
pendent of the specific targets set to the work packages within which it has been 
developed within Planets. As it is introduced within Planets for specific engineering 
purposes, however, the relationship between model and implementation is ex-
plained in section 7 below. 
2.  Preserving Information: An Engineering Dilemma 
Already in the second paragraph of his path breaking paper on A Mathematical 
Theory of Communication, Shannon (1948) notes that “semantic aspects of com-
munication are irrelevant to the engineering problem”. This focus on a set of prob-
lems, for which practical solutions could immediately be derived from the argument 
presented, is probably one of the main reasons for the enormous influence Shan-
non’s paper has had. On the other hand, one could say that what is discussed as 
information by him is misnamed: Within the widely accepted hierarchy of data, 
information, knowledge and wisdom, which is at the heart of most of today’s explo-
rations of the relationship between symbols and their intelligent processing, Shan-
non is clearly operating on the level of data, not on that of information. 
That there is a difference between information and the symbols representing it is 
scarcely new: Indeed it is the starting point for most types of linguistic thinking. 
That this difference exists is sometimes tacitly, occasionally quite openly, acknowl-
edged by most introductory texts into computer science, especially the ones with an 
engineering flavour. Indeed, among the various definitions of computer science, the 
assumption that it is the discipline dealing with ways to represent information in 
such a way that these representations can be processed is probably the most widely 
used one. This has the great virtue that we can process the data representing the 
information without solving the much more elusive problem of what information 
actually is. That this is unsatisfactory – as humans ultimately need information, not 
data – is obvious from the trend of the last decades to talk more and more of infor-
mation technology rather than data processing. While this trend is obvious, it 
seems, however, not to be accompanied by consistent progress in the understanding 
of information itself. 
For long-term preservation, this is extremely unfortunate: While for signals, 
which are transmitted between contemporary individuals, it can be assumed that 
whatsoever interpretative context is needed to make the signals meaningful is avail-
able for the sender as well as the recipient, the preservation of data which cannot be 
correctly translated into information would scarcely be helpful – Shannon does not 
deal explicitly with signal context, however. 
Undoubtedly there exist models of information which are much further removed 
from the level of data; unfortunately, the way from these models to a piece of work-
ing software engineering is much less obvious than that between Shannon’s model 
and signal processing gear. A very interesting example is Langefors’ “infological 
equation” (1995): 
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(1)      I = i (D, S, t) 
Information (I) is understood here as the result of a process of interpretation (i) that 
is applied to data (D), applying previous knowledge (S) within the time available 
(t). The great attraction of this model is that – unlike Shannon’s – it explicitly prom-
ises to model the meaning of messages, which are explicitly excluded from consid-
eration by Shannon. To emphasize the difference between the models, we could say 
that Shannon assumes information to exist statically, therefore it can be broken into 
discrete units, independent of any process dealing with it, while Langefors under-
stands information to be the result of a dynamic process, which, having a relation-
ship to time, goes through different stages: So the amount of information existing at 
tn is not – or not necessarily – equal to the amount of information at tn-1, the ongo-
ing process i having had the chance to produce more of it in the meantime.  
While this equation is intellectually most attractive, it does not easily translate 
into a software design, however. In my opinion, that is due to the fact that the pur-
pose of the model is to explain how information is derived from data; in doing so, it 
employs knowledge, however. Knowledge, unfortunately, as we have noted at the 
beginning, is two levels of abstraction further from data than information. So it is 
hard to see how it would not have to pre-exist, just as in the case of Shannon (where 
it does not create an engineering problem, as it is ignored, while it will create a 
problem with a system to implement Langefors’ model, as it is an explicit function-
al component there). 
Or, in a preservation context: To engineer a system for the preservation of in-
formation based on Shannon is impossible, as he ignores an important dimension; 
to engineer such a system for the preservation of information based on Langefors is 
impossible, as it requires the preservation of an abstraction of a higher order 
(“knowledge”) than the abstraction (“information”) for the preservation of which 
we strive. 
3.  Observations on the Conceptual Relationship between 
Data and Information 
When we look for examples to describe the difference between data and infor-
mation, we can choose from many. 
We can, e.g., claim that a byte containing the string of binary digits “01100001” 
represents data. These data become information within a software system by the 
definition in the source code whether this byte represents an integer (mapping the 
data “01100001” into the information “number 97”) or an ASCII character (map-
ping the data “01100001” into the information “character ‘a’ ”). (Example 1) 
We can, however, also use the example of the number 97 to describe the differ-
ence between the data item “97“ and the possibility to derive the items of infor-
mation “temperature of 97 degrees Celsius”, “temperature of 97 degrees Fahren-
heit” or “speed of 97 miles / hour” from it. (Example 2) 
This example could be extended: We could easily claim that a “temperature of 
97 degrees of Fahrenheit” is a data item, which turns into information only when it 
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is interpreted as either “today’s noon temperature at Tromsø” or as “today’s noon 
temperature at Cairo”, leading to two completely different interpretations on the 
knowledge level when that item of information is contextualized within the two 
different climatic knowledge bases. (Example 3) 
This example could also be contextualized in the opposite direction, however: 
As we know from discussions of optical storage hardware, as well as from Florida 
presidential ballots, the data item “impression of 55% of possible depth into the 
substrate of the medium”, can be interpreted as the information item “0” just as well 
as “1”, depending on the parameters of a drive’s reading head or the political mind-
set of an election official, respectively. (Example 4) 
This, in our opinion, indicates that there is in reality not a juxtaposition between 
two clearly separated concepts “data” and “information”, but a continuum of repre-
sentations between these two terms, each describing an idealtypische construction, 
which, as is the nature of Idealtypen, cannot be observed unadulterated in real life. 
When we look at the four introductory examples again, we furthermore notice 
that each of them describes four interpretative processes, reminding us of Lange-
fors. Using the numbers assigned to the examples above as coordinates on the 
continuum between data and information just proposed, we could claim that the 
relationship between, e.g., the example representing bits as data and typed pro-
gramming language variables as information (example 1) and the one representing 
typed programming language variables as data and variables of a statistical system 
as information (example 2) is expressed by: 
(2)          I2 = i (I1, S2, t) 
For the point x on the continuum between “data only” and “perfect information”, 
this can obviously be generalized to  
(3)          Ix = i (Ix-1, Sx, t) 
which unfortunately still leaves us with the fact that we use S, being expressed in 
“knowledge”, requiring that information has been derived from data and converted 
into that higher order abstraction already before the process described by this for-
malism started. 
The difference between information and knowledge is open to discussion just as 
the difference between data and information is. One definition, which will presum-
ably be accepted by many as explaining the phenomenon partially, even if they do 
not consider it complete, defines knowledge as the set of conditions which allow an 
actor to act adequately if confronted with a piece of information. To generalize the 
relationship between all imaginable types of information, and all the possible sets of 
conditions necessary to act upon them adequately, would clearly be a daunting task 
if we, e.g., consider the sets of conditions necessary to decide upon the adequate 
actions when confronted with possible interpretations of the body language of a 
participant in a social interaction. 
Fortunately, within digital preservation, the scope of knowledge is much more 
restricted: Identifying the irony contained in a digital document and acting correctly 
upon it is clearly beyond the goals of digital preservation. Displaying the stored 
data in such a way that that irony, as transmitted by the text or its visual attributes, 
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could be identified and acted upon by a human reader who has the necessary 
knowledge is clearly within these goals. This example has been chosen intentional-
ly: Quite obviously, there is much irony contained in texts that have been transmit-
ted to us in traditional paper-bound documents which totally evades us, as we do 
not have the knowledge necessary to identify it. And – at least within the scope of 
this paper – we assume that digital preservation requires preserving all aspects that 
could have been preserved within the pre-digital tradition of information. Making 
digital information as robust as non-digital information is a clearly circumscribed 
and solvable task for the near future. Trying to solve all sorts of conceptual prob-
lems for the preservation of digital information, which have never been solved for 
pre-digital information, is fascinating: It may, however, blur the solvable core of the 
task so much that it prevents perfectly feasible solutions which are needed now. 
If we accept that digital information has ultimately to be preserved as “byte 
stream” – data –, we are either assuming that the knowledge needed to re-generate 
the information from the data is preserved in some other way, or we accept that, at 
least for the reduced scope defined above, we have to be able to reduce that 
knowledge to information, which in turn is stored as data alongside the data repre-
senting the information we want to preserve in the first place. Let us for these pur-
poses assume that knowledge can be generated from information in a similar way as 
information can be generated from data, say: 
(4)           Sx = s (Ix-1, t) 
Let us also generalize our notion that information is derived from data: We main-
tain that an “item", which is closer to data than the resulting one, is transferred to 
another “item", which is closer to information than the original one. We also main-
tain that this process may be repeated, resulting in a third “item“ which is still 
closer to pure information than the immediate one. We do not claim, however, that 
there are a clear discrete number of stages along the scale used: So two stages in 
this repeatable process of deriving information from data can only be described by 
an ordinal scale. We know that each “item“ during a repetitive application of the 
infological equation will be further from the data level and closer to the information 
level than the preceding one. There is no possibility to measure the distance be-
tween two such steps. To indicate this we drop the numeric subscript from (2) and 
replace it by a generic one. Furthermore, we indicate that the item of information 
we are starting with and the previous knowledge we use need not be related to the 
new level of interpretation by the same distance. Then we get:  
(5)        Ix = i (Ix-α, Sx-β, t) 
If we now insert (4) into (5) we get: 
(6)       Ix = i (Ix-α, s(Ix-β, t), t) 
If we accept the reasoning presented, we have reached a stage where – on the purely 
conceptual level – we have reduced the problem of preserving information to a 
problem of conserving data, within the context of two classes of data-driven pro-
cesses (i(...) and s(...)). Or, in the most general form, to the statement that infor-
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mation develops out of data, by relating data to each other in such a way that the 
context data items mutually provide to each other generates information items. 
This, furthermore, assumes that there are some not-yet-named items which at 
some stage hold data – like the string “Planets“ – and at a later stage, when they are 
placed into a sufficiently rich context by other data, hold information – such as the 
name of a project. 
As long as we restrict ourselves to the restricted scope of preservation as defined 
above, s(...), by the way, can be preserved relatively easily. If we take the example 
of the two numbers 300 and 400 within an image, these two numbers clearly repre-
sent data: Knowing that they stand for width and height turns them into infor-
mation; the process needed to map the byte stream representing the pixels described 
by them into the rendering of an image is the knowledge needed to extract the im-
age. 
The function s(...) could therefore simply be preliminarily described as a set of 
rules needed to construct some basic types of information objects, such as images, 
out of the data that represent them. This task would be trivial if there existed only 
one class of such information objects in the world; it is unsolvable if that number of 
classes of information objects – not of information objects themselves! – grows 
towards infinity. 
4.  Consequences for an Engineering Context: An Intuitive 
Introduction – Texts 
The problem with our concepts so far is that, while they may be convincing by 
themselves, many such attempts at formalization have simply no relationship to any 
working solution. The approach described above, however, lends itself very easily 
and immediately to an implementation for any specific class of information objects. 
If this is true and we find ourselves able to show that the number of necessary 
classes of higher order information objects to be described by s(...) is reasonably 
small, we would be much closer to a solution of the preservation challenge. 
Let us relate the textual example given above – the string “Planets“ and its rela-
tionship to the concept name of a project – to an introductory example from the 
world of markup languages. In the text fragment 
<person><firstName>John</firstName><surname>Biggin</surname></person> 
we can describe “John“ and “Smith“ as two tokens, which carry information, 
though they are data. Or rather more, we call them two series of discrete tokens 
{‘J’, ‘o’, ‘h’, ‘n’} and {‘B’', ‘i’, ‘g’, ‘g’, ‘i’, ‘n’}. For all representations of infor-
mation, there is one level at which these tokens become atomic: For images, e.g., at 
the level of pixel values, for trivial texts, at the level of individual characters. The 
“static“ representation of the data is the string “Biggin”; that it constitutes a “sur-
name“ is derived from additional data providing a context. 
To explore some of the consequences of this model, let there be four chunks of 
information: 
1) <person><surname><bold>Biggin</bold></surname></person> 
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2) <person><surname><italics>Biggin</italics></surname></person> 
3) <airfield><name><bold>Biggin</bold></name></airfield> 
4) <airfield><name><italics>Biggin</italics></name></airfield> 
Which of the chunks are more similar to each other: (1) and (2) or (1) and (3)? 
There is obviously no intersubjective answer to this question, as in one case we 
talk about a similarity on the interpretative level, on the other hand about one on the 
visualization level. Note that we have not claimed that one of these possible inter-
pretations might hold more or less information than the other. Rather we propose to 
interpret this as a case where the two interpretations are promoting the data con-
tained in the basic tokens towards information, do so in two independent directions, 
however, as in figure 1 below. 
Figure 1: Basic Coordinate Concept 
 
We have used here the concept of two orthogonal dimensions to interpret the rela-
tionship between two different ways of applying context to data items: Please note 
that the coordinates in these two conceptual dimensions, as we call them, are not 
measured in rational numbers: The statement that the chain (1) of content-carrying 
items above is located at (x2, y5) and that (3) is located at (x6, y5) is valid as soon as 
we accept that y5 stands for “bold”, x2 stands for “surname of a person” and x6 for 
“name of an airfield”. Whether, e.g., a graph describing the semantic space of 
names exists, allowing a statement on the relative semantic proximity of x2 and x6, 
may influence the engineering usefulness of such a representation. It is not immedi-
ately necessary for its application, however. 
This approach at modelling the context, which feeds Langefors’ process i(...) 
creating information out of data, can be described as a conceptual space of n or-
thogonal conceptual dimensions in which the content-carrying atomic tokens are 
presented. 
We have already emphasized that a conceptual dimension can be connected to a 
metric which allows algebraic operations – e.g. the conceptual dimension “font 
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size”", but in our model it in no way has to be so. We have said above in (6) that, 
for applying it to preservation purposes, we require the infological equation from 
which we started to be converted into a fully recursive model, where Langefors’' 
“previous knowledge“ can be preserved by the same mechanism which we use for 
the preservation of the data which are converted, with the help of that knowledge, 
into information. If we say that conceptual information can be described by dimen-
sions, which, as long as they remain orthogonal, can be measured by any kind of 
information, we imply that a chain of content-carrying atomic tokens usually de-
scribed as a text can be localized within a conceptual dimension by another text (the 
information contained in which can be traced back to another chain of content-
carrying atomic tokens). 
A simple example of this is provided by a text like: 
CAESAR  
 1.2.191 Let me have men about me that are fat; 
 1.2.192 Sleek-headed men and such as sleep o’ nights: 
 1.2.193 Yond Cassius has a lean and hungry look;  
 1.2.195 He thinks too much: such men are dangerous.  
In this case { Let me have men about me that are fat; Sleek-headed men and such as 
sleep o’ nights: Yond Cassius has a lean and hungry look; He thinks too much: such 
men are dangerous. } can be described as having the conceptual dimension “author 
= Caesar”, while the line { Let me have men about me that are fat; } or more pre-
cisely all characters constituting the tokens it is made of, have, independent of this, 
also the conceptual dimension “located on line 191 of scene 2 of act 1”. 
In an even more extreme case:  
To be or not to be, that is the question* 
*Hamlet, Act 3, Scene 1  
can be described as containing one content-carrying atomic token – ‘*’ – which is 
measured on a dimension “background explanation” by the series of content-
carrying atomic tokens “Hamlet, Act 3, Scene 1”. 
5.  Consequences for an Engineering Context: An Intuitive 
Introduction – Non-texts 
While we have chosen our examples from the world of texts so far, there is no 
reason why the previous assumptions should not be extended to cover other types of 
data. In the example given below, there is clearly a set of pixels which can be con-
nected not only to the properties all of the pixels in the image have in common – 
being meaningfully interpreted as an image of x times y pixels, having a certain 
colour depth – but also to some which are specific for this set of pixels: e.g. repre-
senting the text “Liber exodi glosatus”. That a conceptual dimension can have an 
image as value, we will not discuss in detail, as we assume it to be obvious. 
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There is a very fundamental difference between images and texts, however: con-
tent-carrying atomic tokens of texts occur in series which have exactly one dimen-
sion. A text is a series of characters following each other. That a text may be non-
linear does not change this basic property. If at some stage in a text two branches 
split – be it the two parallel sections in typesetting, e.g., a text accompanied by 
emphasized keywords at the sides of the main page, be it the texts of different 
origins bound together to a composite document, as e.g. in critical editing – each of 
these two branches is nevertheless exactly one series of content-carrying atomic 
tokens (characters). So to connect a conceptual dimension to a section of the con-
tent-carrying atomic tokens, two numbers suffice: One defining with which content-
carrying atomic token in the linear sequence the applicability of a conceptual di-
mension starts, and one which defines where it ends. 
Figure 2: Image with Text 
 
 
In contrast, within an image interpretative information expressed in arbitrarily many 
conceptual dimensions will always be connected to a two-dimensional area – either 
to the image as a whole or to a section of it, as in the example above where a tran-
scribed string was connected to a subsection of an image. 
There is another difference between images and texts, if understood as repre-
sented here. The content-carrying atomic tokens in an image – usually called pixels 
– are in recent images values which, by a direct process connected to some measur-
ing device, usually express a degree of intensity. As measurements, they can be 
used within arithmetical expressions and comparisons. While in reality it may be a 
bit more complicated, at least in many images we can say that a pixel value of 100 
is exactly twice as intensive as a pixel value of 50, and the pixel value 110 is 10% 
more intense than the pixel value 100. In terms of the metrics as used within statis-
tical computations, we can therefore say that the content-carrying atomic tokens can 
be measured on rational scales. 
With texts, on the other hand, such a relationship does not exist. A character 
with a pixel value 110 (‘n’) is not 10% more of anything than 100 (‘d’). Neverthe-
less, a meaningful relationship could be expressed between these two values, as 110 
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is later in the collating sequence. There is a relationship between the two values, 
therefore – usually measured on ordinal scales. 
This type of applicable metrics is independent of the basic types from which we 
have chosen our examples: There are – or have been historically – images where the 
pixel values are not expressed on a rational scale, but where they represent look-up 
indices of a colour table, not even being rational but nominal, if we follow the 
distinction of applicable scales for measurement. 
On a purely intuitive level we can therefore conclude that images and texts can 
both be described by the concept of content-carrying atomic tokens, where (a) the 
assembly of tokens follows a certain basic logic – one-dimensional sequence, two-
dimensional matrix – and (b) there exists a specific system of measurement or 
system of metrics to express the relationships between content-carrying atomic 
tokens. 
 For both types of higher order information objects we can also say that they can 
be described by each of the content-carrying atomic tokens – or more intuitively: 
any meaningful complex of such tokens – can be measured by their position on a 
set of conceptual dimensions. 
And, as the positions on these conceptual dimensions can be denoted by a very 
wide variety of items of information, the relative position of two content-carrying 
atomic tokens, or complexes of such tokens, on any conceptual dimension can be 
measured by completely different metrics. As the dimensions are orthogonal, it is 
furthermore not immediately necessary to try to map these various metrics upon a 
common one, as long as we measure distances only within individual dimensions. 
6.  Consequences for an Engineering Context: An Attempt 
at Formalization 
To make the generalization easier, we will redraw our representation first by indi-
cating the positions of individual token by the vectors describing their position on 
the interpretative dimension. To explain about the letter ‘g’ in the set of content-
carrying atomic tokens being at the positions “bold” and “surname” on the dimen-
sions “visualization” and “interpretation”, we therefore draw figure 3 below.  
In the least general way, we can describe this representation of a text as the 
string of characters “Biggin” interpreted within the conceptual space defined by the 
dimensions visualization { bold, italic } and interpretation {surname, topographical 
name}. 
Slightly more general, we can rephrase this by saying that any text like this can 
be described as a set of content-carrying atomic tokens within the conceptual space 
defined by two conceptual dimensions, or, more formally: 
(7)  <text> ::= { T, C1, C2 } 
or, more generally: 
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Figure 3: Basic Example in Vector Notation 
 
(8)  <text> ::= { T, C1, C2, ..., Cn } 
which we will write henceforth as 
(9)  <text> ::= { T, Cn } 
to express texts as “sequences of content-carrying atomic tokens, each of which has 
a well-defined position within an n-dimensional conceptual universe”. 
Using the same formalism to describe our considerations of an image discussed 
above, we can write: 
(10)  <image> ::= { Tx x Ty, Cn } 
to express images as “planes of content-carrying atomic tokens, each of which 
has a well-defined position within an n-dimensional conceptual universe”. 
From this we easily arrive at the generalization 
(11)  <I> ::= { T1 x T2 x ... x Tm, Cn } 
or 
(12)  <I> ::= { Tm, Cn } 
to express arbitrary information objects as m-dimensional arrangements of content-
carrying atomic tokens, each of which has a well-defined position within an n-
dimensional conceptual universe. 
Examples for 3- or 4-dimensional information objects are easy to find: A video 
can generally be represented as a series of two dimensional objects; a 3-D simula-
tion as a series of 3-dimensional snapshots. 
In both cases, the arrangements of tokens and the conceptual universes, we un-
derstand a “dimension”, be it one of token space or of conceptual space, as a defini-
tion of the metrics needed to express meaningful measurements within this dimen-
sion. 
7.  Relationship of the Abstract Model to the XCL 
The abstract model described above may seem to be far from the eXtensible Char-
acterisation Languages. What it describes, however, is the clean separation between 
the normData – content-carrying atomic tokens, which are mapped from their origi-
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nal representation unto dimensions with a well-defined metric – and the properties 
describing arbitrary segments of them. normData mapping happens, e.g., when 
image information is converted from the object colour space used within an image 
file to the standard RGB colour space underlying the image definition of the XCDL. 
Only by mapping normData into such standard token spaces do they become com-
parable. 
Connecting this construction back to the theoretical considerations we started 
from, we propose to understand an XCEL – which is a formal specification, i.e., a 
document describing the way in which information contained in a digital object can 
be stored as data in a file format – as an implementation of Langefors’ i(...), the 
process generating information from data. The knowledge about the behaviour of 
one of the information objects defined within the preceding section – text, image – 
is an implementation of the s(...) which we proposed analogously to i(...) in formal-
ism (4) of section 3 above. 
8.  Relationship to Layout and Semantics 
It has been shown (in an unpublished internal deliverable of the Planets project) that 
the inclusion of the requirement to preserve layout characteristics of a document, 
beyond preserving the information contained within the actual documents, leads to 
conflicting recommendations. While the capability to distinguish between a text 
contained in the main section of a document vs. the same text being part of a foot-
note is preserved better for a human reader of the document by one decision, the 
same capability may be preserved better for handling by software applications by a 
different, indeed contradictory, decision. 
On the purely conceptual level this can be described as a case where knowledge 
about a layout principle pre-exists within the human reader, say “If at the bottom of 
the page a text in a smaller type font exists, where individual paragraphs of such 
texts are preceded by raised numerals, such a block of text represents a footnote to 
that portion of the main text, where the same numeral appears in a smaller, raised 
font within the main text”. For the human reader the rendering of that relationship 
by a word processing system – as e.g. an Office application – and a page descriptive 
one, – like e.g. PDF – cannot be distinguished, as (s)he derives the relationship in 
both cases from the kind of knowledge about layout described before. 
For a technical system interpreting the data, the relationship is expressed explic-
itly in virtually all word processing formats; it can, therefore, easily be extracted 
and expressed within an XCDL representation of an office document. In the case of 
a page description language like PDF, however, the file contains only layout infor-
mation and does not make the relationship between two blocks of text explicit.  
Obviously it would be possible to implement at least some types of pre-existing 
knowledge about layout in such a way that the implicit relationship is extracted 
from a generalized representation of the textual object. A number of ways to 
achieve this would be possible. One possible procedure could be as follows: 
1) Extract from the file to be processed a new type of textual object, where the 
content-carrying atomic tokens form a plane. Each token is described by arbi-
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trarily many conceptual dimensions, two of which represent the position of 
the token within the plane. 
2) Apply an additional algorithm unto this preliminary textual object, mapping 
properties so far expressed by the positions in the textual plane into concep-
tual dimensions. 
3) Transform this textual object, where the content-carrying tokens are arranged 
in a plane, into the standard textual object where the content-carrying tokens 
form a linear series. 
This procedure would be completely compatible with the conceptual model chosen: 
As Sx = s (Ix-1, t) depends on time and describes the transformation between infor-
mation and knowledge as gradual, we have here an instance of a procedure where 
the data is simply further advanced on the gradual conversion from data into 
knowledge after the application of the second transformation. 
We would like to emphasize again that the goal of the XCL is not to solve prob-
lems of preservation considered unsolvable in the pre-digital handling of infor-
mation, but to bring digital preservation unto the same level as pre-digital preserva-
tion. Nevertheless, the example given above for the integration of knowledge 
derived from an interpretation of layout into the basic XCL extraction logic encour-
ages us to assume that the strategy described here should also be explored to im-
plement preservation strategies for other types of content, notably semantic ones, 
which are also derived from an interpretation of lower levels of extracting infor-
mation from the stored data. 
